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Collective decision-making characterizes all advanced social insects and is particularly important for 
the acquisition and defense of nests. The outcomes of such collective decisions are usually adaptive 
for colonies, even though they are based on many binary individual decisions. Here we report on an 
unusual conditional decision-making system involving three antagonistic ant species: A 
Sericomyrmex fungus-farming host ant, a parasitic Megalomyrmex guest ant producing alkaloid 
venom, and a raiding Gnamptogenys agro-predator. We show experimentally that a complex 
conditional mutualism is mediated through simple pairwise interactions at both individual and 
colony levels. We treat the system as a symbiotic species network (host ant-fungus-social parasite), 
building from interaction trials with few individuals to a colony level choice experiment. The guest 
ants effectively protect their host colonies against agro-predator raids because their alkaloid venom 
is more potent than the biting defenses of the host ants. Relatively few guest ants are sufficient to 
kill raiders that invariably exterminate host nests without guests. We also show that the odor of 
guest ants discourages raider scouts from recruiting nestmates to host colonies. Our results imply 
that Sericomyrmex fungus-growers obtain a net benefit from their costly guest ants behaving as a 
functional soldier caste to counter agro-predator raiders (www.megalomyrmex.com/videos). The 
different life histories of the agro-predators and guest ants can facilitate their coexistence in a 
negative frequency dependent manner. Because a guest ant colony is committed to exploit a single 
host colony for life, the guests would harm their own interests by not defending the host. 
Cooperation is thus enforced by external threat according to the principle that the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend. This conditional mutualism is analogous to episodes in human history when 
mercenary city defenders offered net benefits or imposed net costs, depending on the level of threat 
from invading armies.
